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IX. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
A. Age and Disability Discrimination
In Sigurdson v. Carl Bolander & Sons, Co.,' the Minnesota
Supreme Court analyzed issues involving age discrimination and
disability discrimination. Carl Bolander & Sons ("Bolander")
had a job opening for a truck mechanic in December 1989.2
Bolander advertised thisjob opening by posting it internally and
by contacting the director of Northeast Metro Technical College
("Vo-tech").' Stuart Sigurdson arrived at Bolander without an
appointment and filled out an employment application.4
Sigurdson, age fifty-two, applied for a truck mechanic position.5
Sigurdson was interviewed by Thomas Slaughter.' In the
interview, Slaughter learned that Sigurdson had not worked as
a mechanic since August 1988 and that Sigurdson's primary
experience involved engine rebuilding.7 At the end of the
interview, Sigurdson volunteered that he was diabetic.8 Slaugh-
ter then asked Sigurdson if he had to take insulin.' Sigurdson
replied that he took insulin and that he had had some sei-
zures.
10
The next contact between Sigurdson and Slaughter was
disputed.11 Sigurdson said that he called Slaughter to follow up
on the status of his application.12 Sigurdson said that Slaughter
referred him to Bolander's attorney, Steve Vodonik.1 ' Sigurd-
son further stated that Vodonik told him that he was not hired
1. 532 N.W.2d 225 (Minn. 1995).
2. Id. at 227.
3. Id. Sigurdson learned of the job opening through the parents of a Bolander
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because Bolander did not want to hire a diabetic. 4 Slaughter
denied the conversation happened in that manner. 5 Slaughter
stated that he called Sigurdson to thank him and to tell him he
was not hired.16 Slaughter said that Sigurdson then asked if it
was because he was diabetic. 7 To that question, Slaughter
replied no.'" Bolander subsequently hired Jeffrey Schertz, a
recent graduate of the Vo-tech who was recommended by the
director of the college. 19
Sigurdson was not hired and he subsequently brought suit
against Bolander for age and disability discrimination under the
Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minnesota Statutes Chapter
363.20 Sigurdson's basis for the disability discrimination suit
was that Bolander knew Sigurdson was diabetic, and that was the
reason he was not hired.2' Sigurdson later amended his
complaint to include an allegation that Bolander's preference to
hire recent Vo-tech graduates had a disparate impact on older
mechanics.22  The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Bolander on both claims.23
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the age discrimi-
nation claim but reversed the disability discrimination claim.24
The court stated that there was a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Bolander discriminated against Sigurdson based on
his diabetes.2 5 The court of appeals held that Sigurdson failed
to allege a prima facie case of age discrimination. 26  Both
parties appealed.2 7 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the
disability discrimination claim and affirmed the age discrimina-











24. Sigurdson v. Carl Bolander & Sons, Co., 511 N.W.2d 482, 490 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994).
25. Sigurdson, 532 N.W.2d at 227.
26. Id. at 227-28.
27. Id. at 228.
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judgment in favor of Bolander on both claims.2"
The Supreme Court first addressed the disability discrimina-
tion claim. 9 The court required Sigurdson to establish a prima
facie case of disability discrimination either by showing direct
evidence of a discriminatory motive or by making four showings
that indirectly prove the existence of a discriminatory motive.' °
The court looked to the Minnesota Human Rights Act to find a
discriminatory motive by Bolander.3 '
The court first addressed whether Sigurdson's disability
claim based on diabetes satisfied the Minnesota Human Rights
Act's definition of disability.3" The Minnesota Human Rights
Act defines disability as:
[A]ny condition or characteristic that renders a person a
disabled person. A disabled person is any person who (1) has
a physical, sensory, or mental impairment which materially
limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of
such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an
impairment.
33
The court focused on the first definition of disability.34 Specifi-
cally, the court acknowledged that diabetes is an impairment 3'
and that working is a major life activity,36 but questioned
whether diabetes caused a material impairment as required by
the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 7 The court recognized that
impairments that are not materially limiting but are treated as
28. Id. at 227.
29. Id. at 228.
30. Id. (citing Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. 1986)). The
court listed the four showings: (1) that the plaintiff "belongs to a protected class;" (2)
that the plaintiff "applied and was qualified for the job for which the employer was
seeking applications;" (3) "that, despite this qualification, he was rejected"; and (4) "that
after his rejection, the position remained available or was given to someone else with
his qualifications." Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973)).
31. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1994)). The Minnesota Human Rights Act
states that it is an unfair employment practice for an employer "to refuse to hire or
maintain a system of employment which unreasonably excludes a person seeking
employment" on the basis of disability. MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (a) (1994).
32. Sigurdson, 532 N.W.2d at 228.
33. MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 13 (1994).
34. Sigurdson, 532 N.W.2d at 228.
35. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.101 App. A (1994)).
36. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.2(j) (2) (ii) (1994)).
37. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 13(1) (1994).
1996]
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such will be deemed to be materially limiting.' However, the
court cited State by Cooper v. Hennepin County, 9 which held that
a person who has only been rejected for one specificjob because
of his disability and who does not show that he is likely to be
rejected for similar jobs in the future fails to meet the substan-
tially limited standard prescribed in the Minnesota Human
Rights Act.4°
In determining whether Sigurdson's diabetes caused a
material impairment on the major life activity of working, the
court examined the evidence at the trial court.41 At the trial,
Sigurdson testified that the diabetes affected his diet and his
ability to eat, which in turn affected his health, and thus,
affected his work.42 He testified he had never before been
discriminated against because of his diabetes.4 The court also
considered evidence that Sigurdson's ability to work had not
been greatly impeded as he had obtained and retained employ-
ment for most of his adult years." The court held that Sigurd-
son's failure to obtain one job with Bolander did not render him
disabled, 4 and that Sigurdson clearly failed to meet the statuto-
ry requirements of disability discrimination. 4  Further, the
court stated that even if Sigurdson's assertions were true, they
did not give rise to a prima facie case of disability discrimina-
47tion.
The court next addressed Sigurdson's age discrimination
claim. As in all disparate impact claims, the court required the
plaintiff to demonstrate through "competent evidence, that the
presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a
38. Sigurdson, 532 N.W.2d at 228 (citing State by Cooper v. Hennepin County, 441
N.W.2d 106, 112 (Minn. 1989)).
39. 441 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. 1989).
40. Sigurdson, 532 N.W.2d at 222 (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (a) (1994)
and Cooper, 441 N.W.2d at 111). The court recognized that since the court's holding
in Cooper, the Minnesota Human Rights Act had been amended so that "the impairment
need only materially limit one or more life activities." The court still applied the same
considerations and factors, though they are now in a less stringent light. Id.
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pretext for a discriminatory decision based on age."' The
court held that Sigurdson presented no competent evidence
regarding the pool of applicants or any systematic exclusion of
older people to support his claim.49 In fact, Bolander present-
ed evidence it had employed several mechanics over the age of
forty.5° Because Sigurdson failed to present competent evi-
dence, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment on the age discrimination claim.51
B. Age Discrimination Under the Minnesota Human Rights Act
The case of State by Beaulieu v. Independent School District No.
62452 involved the "interpretation of the age discrimination
provisions of the Minnesota Human Rights Act" ("MHRA"). 5
Specifically, this case examined how the MHRA applies to early
retirement incentive programs.54
Colleen Leemon was employed in various positions by
Independent School District No. 624 ("ISD") from 1976 to
1987.J The contract that governed Leemon's employment
contained an early retirement provision that provided for
severance pay and insurance reimbursements at the age of forty-
five.56 In 1987, Leemon voluntarily terminated her employ-
48. Id. (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-




52. 533 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1995).




56. Id. The provision provided the following:
Section 1. Administrators who have completed at least ten (10) years of
continuous service with the School District and who are at least forty-five (45)
years of age shall be eligible for severance pay, pursuant to the provisions of
this Article, upon submission of a written resignation accepted by the School
Board by April 1st.
Section 3. Administrators, upon early retirement, shall receive as severance
pay an amount representing present contract salary.
Section 4. An administrator who retires after June 30, 1985 shall be eligible
for severance pay as defined and limited in Sections 3 and 4 according to the
following schedule relating to the employee's age at the end of the school year
in which early retirement occurs: [chart of percentage paid (percentages paid
decrease as age increased)]
19961
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ment at the age of thirty-six." She then attempted to collect
severance pay and insurance premium reimbursements from ISD
under the early retirement provision but was denied because she
failed to meet the age requirement.58  Leemon subsequently
filed an age discrimination claim with the Minnesota Department
of Human Rights ("Department") against.59
The Department found probable cause as to Leemon's
charge and filed a claim on her behalf against ISD alleging that
the age-based early retirement provisions violated the MHRA,
section 363.03, subdivision 1(2).' An administrative law judge
concluded ISD had unlawfully discriminated against Leemon on
the basis of age and granted summary judgment in her favor.61
ISD appealed the administrative law judge's decision.62
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the administrative law
judge6" and held that ISD's voluntary early retirement incentive
provisions were authorized by Minnesota Statutes section
465.72.64 The court stated that although ISD's provisions
discriminated against employees based on age, the provisions
were not unlawful.6"
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the
Section 8. An administrator who retires early pursuant to this Article shall be
eligible to continue participation in the District group medical-hospitalization,
dental and group life insurance plans or individual plans selected by the
retiring administrator and shall receive the same School District contributions
as provided for other administrators. The amount of life insurance shall be
$150,000. The administrator's right to participation and contribution in such
group insurance will be for a period of ten (10) years or age 70, whichever
comes first. The benefits contained in this Section may be fully or partially
delayed from the date of retirement to age 60 at the discretion of the adminis-
trator.
Subd. 1. The administrator, upon the completion of the ten (10) year time
limit or prior to age 71, may elect to enroll in all or part of the insurance




58. Id. at 394-95.
59. Id. at 395.
60. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (1986)).
61. Id. In a second order, the administrative lawjudge directed the School District
to pay Leemon in excess of $100,000. Id.
62. Id.
63. The reversal was a split decision. Id.
64. Beaulieu v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 624, 509 N.W.2d 572, 573 (Minn. CL
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66relationship between the MHRA and other Minnesota statutes.
The court first addressed the MHRA, which "clearly prohibits age
discrimination with respect to employee compensation. "67
Focusing on the MHRA, the court discussed one exception:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit the
establishment of differential privileges, benefits, services or
facilities for persons of designated ages if (a) such differential
treatment is provided pursuant to statute. ... "' Thus, the court
determined the applicability of this MHRA exception turned on
whether a separate statute authorized differential treatment of
employees based on age." ISD argued the age differentiation
under the early retirement provision was permitted under the
MHRA exception because it was authorized under Minnesota
Statutes section 465.72, subdivion 1,70 which provides in perti-
nent part: ". . . any county, city, township, school district or other
governmental subdivision may pay severance pay to its employees
and promulgate rules for the payment of severance pay to an
employee who leaves employment on or before or subsequent to
the normal retirement date."71 ISD further argued that "the
authority to pay severance pay and to promulgate rules for the
payment of such pay implicitly includes authority to differentiate
between employees" on the basis of age.72 The court agreed
with the Scholl District's analysis of Minnesota Statutes section
465.72, subdivision 1. 7 1 The court added that in the simple
language of Minnesota Statutes section 465.72, subdivion 1, the
Legislature clearly manifested its intent to authorize ISD's early
retirement program.
74
The court further reasoned that this conclusion conformed
66. Beaulieu, 533 N.W.2d at 395.
67. Id. The court specifically looked at Minnesota Statutes § 363.03, subdivision
1: "[I]t is an unfair employment practice: ... (2) For an employer, because of... age,
... (c) to discriminate against a person with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation,
terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities or privileges of employment." MINN. STAT.
§ 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c) (1986).
68. Beaulieu, 533 N.W.2d at 395 (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.02, subd. 6 (1986)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 396 (citing MINN. STAT. § 465.72, subd. 1 (1986)).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The court noted that the early retirement program payments were limited
by the language of Minnesota Statutes § 465.72, subdivision 1 (1986). Id. The
payments could not exceed one year of pay. Id.
19961
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with the basic rules of statutory construction,75 namely that
apparently conflicting laws are to be construed together, if
possible, to give effect to both provisions. 76  The court also
found that this decision is "consistent with the broad public
policy underlying the MHRA's" age discrimination prohibition,
which allows exceptions only when authorized in other legislative
enactments. 77  Finally, the court concluded that a statutory
scheme that did not allow a school district to develop an early
retirement program limited to persons of a certain age would be
unreasonable.78
C. Breach of Contract and Promissory Estoppel
In Ruud v. Great Plains Supply, Inc.,79 the Minnesota Su-
preme Court analyzed claims of breach of express contract and
breach of implied contract by promissory estoppel arising in the
employment law setting." Kevin Ruud was employed by Great
Plains Supply, Inc. ("GPS") from July 1978 to October 1991.81
In 1988, Ruud became the manager of GPS's Twin Valley,
Minnesota store. 2 Diane Ruud, Kevin Ruud's wife, was em-
ployed as the vice president of the Twin Valley State Bank.8'
In 1990, Kevin Ruud began having discussions with the
owner of GPS, Michael Wigley, about a possible transfer to a
Sioux City, Iowa store. 4 Ruud knew the Sioux City store was
unprofitable and might have to be closed. 5 Ruud asked Wigley
what would happen if the Sioux City job did not work out and
Wigley responded, "Good employees are taken care of" and "You
are considered a good employee." 6 Ruud then met with the
vice president of GPS, Ronald Nelson, who also stated that
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.26, subd. 1 (1994)).
77. Id.
78. Id. The court relied on Minnesota Statutes § 645.17(1), which states that there
is a presumption that "the legislature does not intend a result that is unreasonable."
Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 645.17(1) (1994)).
79. 526 N.W.2d 369, 370 (Minn. 1995).
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"Good employees [are taken] care of."8 7 In addition, Nelson
told Ruud that if the Sioux City position did not work out, he
would be given a similar position elsewhere in the corpora-
tion.' Ruud was then offered the Sioux City position by
Nelson, but he declined. 9 In a memo dated April 12, 1990,
Wigley confirmed what he believed were the elements of the oral
offer that he made to Ruud on March 30, 1990. He listed the
following elements: terms of employment such as salary, living
allowance, and moving and related expenses, but no provisions
regarding job security.' Ruud accepted this offer and subse-
quently moved to Sioux City without his family.91
When asked how he was doing in Sioux City, Ruud stated it
was hard to adjust to life as a bachelor.9 2 Nelson responded,
"Well, you better get your family down [here] then."93 In
response to this request, Diane Ruud quit her job in November
1990, instead of spring 1991 as had been earlier planned. 4
Diane Ruud never talked to GPS about this issue nor did she
believe that she thought her husband's job would have been
threatened had she not moved right away.95
Under Kevin Ruud's management, the Sioux City store
continued to operate at a loss.96 In May 1991, Ruud asked
Nelson what would happen if the store was eventually closed.9 7
Ruud alleged that Nelson again responded, "Good employees are
taken care of."8 Ruud was told that he would be terminated
as manager of the Sioux City store on July 22, 1991, and was




90. Id. at 371.
91. Id. Kevin Ruud moved to Sioux City in April 1990 and his family was to join
him during spring 1991. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Kevin Ruud characterized Nelson's statement as a "demand." This






99. Id. Two of the positions required further relocation and none were at a
managerial level. Id. Further, all of the positions would have resulted in decreased
compensation to Kevin Ruud. Id.
1996]
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the offers and moved back to Twin Valley, Minnesota with his
family. °°
Kevin and Diane Ruud sued Wigley, Nelson, and GPS for
breach of an express employment contract for permanent
employment, breach of an implied contract created by promisso-
ry estoppel, and fraud and misrepresentation. 1 ' The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of GPS and dismissed
the claims against Wigley and Nelson. °2  The Ruuds ap-
pealed.' The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Kevin
and Diane Ruud could recover fro promissory estoppel and
whether there was a breach of an express employment con-
tract. 104
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
and reinstated the trial court's decision.0 5 The court first
addressed the express contract claim. The court applied the
standard used in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille'0 6 to determine
whether a binding unilateral contract was formed.10 7 Pine River
State Bank held that "[a] promise of employment on particular
terms, if in the form of an offer and if accepted by the employee
for valuable consideration, may create a binding unilateral
contract which will alter" the presumptive employment-at-will
relationship."18
Although the court noted that a contract may be objectively
inferred by the words spoken between the parties,0 9 the offer
must be "definite in form and communicated to the offer-
ee."1" The court further stated that an employer's general
statements of policy do not meet the contractual requirements
100. Id. at 370.




105. Id. at 373. The fraud and misrepresentation claims were not appealed to the
supreme court. Id. at 370 n.1.
106. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1963).
107. Ruud, 526 N.W.2d at 371 (citing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d
622, 626 (Minn. 1983)).
108. Id. (citing Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 626).
109. Id. (citing Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 533, 117 N.W.2d 213,
221 (1962)).
110. Id. (citing Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 626).
[Vol. 22
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for an offer."' The court determined that under Cederstrand
v. Lutheran Brotherhood,"' it was necessary to determine whether
GPS had the "intention to make such a promise as an offer and
to be bound by it.""
3
When applying the contract standards to the Ruuds'
situation, the court focused on the comments made by Wigley
and Nelson to Kevin Ruud.11 4  For purposes of summary
judgment determination, GPS conceded that all the statements
were made." 5 Thus, the court needed to determine whether
the comments made by Wigley and Nelson manifested an intent
to promise permanent employment to Ruud." 6 The court
determined the statements made in this case were similar to
statements made in Degen v. Investors Diversified Se v*ices" 7 and
Cederstrand."s In Degen, the court found no offer for lifetime
employment where the employer told the employee that he had
a great future with the company and that he could consider his
job a "career situation. ""' In Cederstrand, the president of an
insurance company told employees that "there would be no
dismissals as long as people showed willingness to work and the
ability and wanting to learn." 2 °
Following Degen and Cederstrand, the court concluded that
Wigley and Nelson did not intend that GPS offer Kevin Ruud a
permanent job; they were simply making policy statements as to
the general goodwill of the company toward its employees.12 1
Further, the court held even if the comments did manifest an
intent to constitute a modification of the employment-at-will
111. Id. (citing Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 627). The court cited Degen v.
Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 260 Minn. 424, 110 N.W.2d 863 (1961), to further
support this rule. Id. at 372.
112. 263 Minn. 520, 117 N.W.2d 213 (1962).
113. Ruud, 526 N.W.2d at 372 (citing Cederstrand, 263 Minn. at 533, 117 N.W.2d at
221).
114. Id. The court stated that "It is conceded that he was an at-will employee under
the terms of a GPS employee handbook absent the comments made by Wigley and
Nelson." Id. at 372 n.2.
115. Id. at 372 n.3.
116. Id. at 372.
117. 260 Minn. 424, 110 N.W.2d 863 (1961).
118. Ruud, 526 N.W.2d at 372.
119. Id. (citing Degen, 260 Minn. at 428, 110 N.W.2d at 866).
120. Id. (citing Cederstrand, 263 Minn. at 523, 117 N.W.2d at 216). Although not
explained in the opinion, the court in Cederstrand found that this statement was
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relationship, the statements by Nelson and Wigley were so vague
that the nature of the modification would be undetermin-
able.122 As a matter of law, the court held the statements made
by Wigley and Nelson were not sufficiently definite as to create
an offer of permanent employment to Ruud.1
2 3
The court next addressed the promissory estoppel claim.'
24
The court analyzed the promissory estoppel claim under the test
iterated in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 125 The court only ad-
dressed the first element which required proof that the promise
be clear and definite. 126  As specifically addressed in the con-
tract argument, the court held the statements made by Wigley
and Nelson were not "clear and definite,"127 and as such, did
not support a claim for promissory estoppel.1
28
D. Damages Under the Minnesota Human Rights Act
In Phelps v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 129 the
Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted a damages provision
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA").'" The
trial court concluded that Commonwealth Land Title Insurance
Company ("Commonwealth") discriminated against Geraldine
Phelps on the basis of age and disability in violation of Minneso-
ta Statutes section 363.071, subdivision 2 ("subdivision 2").' s'
The trial court determined that Phelps sustained actual




125. Id. (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992)).
Three elements must be proved to show promissory estoppel: (1) a clear and definite
promise; (2) the promisor's intent to induce reliance, and the occurance of such
reliance; and (3) the promise must be enforced to prevent an injustice. Id.
126. Id. The court stated it was unnecessary to address whether promissory estoppel
extends to third parties because the first element had not been met. Id. at 372 n.4.
The court however, seemed to dismiss Diane Ruud's promissory estoppel claim because
she had not been informed that GPS was requiring the family to move to Sioux City,
nor had she been told that Kevin's job would be in jeopardy if she refused to move.
Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 372.
129. 537 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1995).
130. Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-.20 (1994).
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doubled this figure and awarded Phelps $160,764.66 as compen-
satory damages pursuant to subdivision 2.1"'
On appeal, Commonwealth argued that the trial court
abused its discretion. I" 4 The Minnesota Court of Appeals held
that "[T] he district court acted within its discretion in doubling
Phelps' compensatory damages, even though the court did not
specifically find that Phelps would not be adequately compensat-
ed by an award of actual damages."13 5  On appeal to the
Minnesota Supreme Court, Commonwealth again argued that
the trial court abused its discretion by doubling Phelps' actual
damages under subdivision 2.136
The relevant part of the MHRA is as follows:
In all cases where the administrative law judge finds that the
respondent has engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice,
the administrative lawjudge shall order the respondent to pay
an aggrieved party, who has suffered discrimination, compen-
satory damages in an amount up to three times the actual
damages sustained. In all cases, the administrative law judge
may also order the respondent to pay an aggrieved party, who
has suffered discrimination, damages for mental anguish or
suffering and reasonable attorney's fees, in addition to
punitive damages in an amount not more than $8,500.1 7
In support of their position, Commonwealth made five argu-
133. Id. The trial court also awarded Phelps $75,000 for mental anguish and
suffering, $42,491.99 for attorney fees and costs, and $8,500 for punitive damages. Id.
None of these awards were in dispute on appeal. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 752. In dicta, the court also stated as follows:
Were we to require that multiple damages be tied to uncompensated
damages, we would still affirm the district court's multiplication of
damages in the present case. Phelps persuasively argues that the
following losses would have remained uncompensated by an
unaugmented award of compensatory damages: loss of her pension,
loss of potential raises, loss of dental insurance, and loss of some
medical insurance. ...
Id.
136. Id. at 273. Whether a trial court properly doubled actual damages pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes section 363.071, subdivision 2 is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Id. at 274 (citing Melsha v. Wickes Cos., 459 N.W.2d 707, 709
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990), rev. denied (Oct. 25, 1990)).
Commonwealth also argued that the court of appeals conclusion in dicta was
erroneous because Phelps never presented any evidence of the losses to which the court
referred. Id. The supreme court concluded the court of appeals erred on this point
but the error was irrelevant to the resolution of the case. Phelps, 537 N.W.2d at 273.
137. Id. at 273-74 (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd.2 (1992)).
19961
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ments in favor of reversing the court of appeals.1 18 Common-
wealth also argued that including back pay in the amount of
compensatory damages, which the trial court had doubled,
constituted error.i39
Commonwealth's first argument was that the trial court's
multiplication of damages was inconsistent with legislative
intent."4  If a statute is ambiguous, a court may look to the
legislative history of the statute to ascertain its legislative
intent. 141 However, when the intention of the Legislature is
clearly manifested by plain unambiguous language, referring to
the legislative history of the statute is neither necessary nor
permitted. 42 Thus, the court was left to determine whether
the statute in question was ambiguous. Citing several previous
Minnesota Supreme Court cases, the court stated that "[a]
statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation." 43 Commonwealth did not argue
that the statute was susceptible to more than one meaning.14
Rather, Commowealth argued the statute was ambiguous because
it provided no guidance to trial courts in determining when
compensatory damages are to be multiplied. 45
The court, however, dismissed Commonwealth's argument
stating that failure of expression does not give rise to ambigu-
ity.1" Simply because there is an absence of guidelines on the
trial court's discretion to multiply damages does not make
subdivision 2 ambiguous, the court concluded.147  Thus, the
court held that subdivision 2 unambiguously allows trial courts
the discretion to multiply damages."4
Second, Commonwealth argued that the trial court's award
138. Id. at 274-77.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 274 (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16(7) (1994)).





146. Id. (citing State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 269, 95 N.W.2d 6, 11-12 (1959);
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was inconsistent with standards articulated by other courts."
Because the court had already decided the trial court had
discretion to multiply damages under subdivision 2, they held
this argument was moot."'
Commonwealth further argued that under Melsha v. Wickes
Co., 5' a trial court must make a finding that the victim was not
fully compensated to multiply damages.15 The court held that
because subdivision 2 unambiguously divests discretion in the
trial court to multiply damages, no finding other than an initial
finding of damages is required to multiply damages.153
The court next discussed the difference between actual and
compensatory damages.'54 The majority argued the law is well
settled that the phrase "actual damages" is generally regarded as
a synonym for compensatory damages.155  The court then
recognized that it had to interpret what the Legislature meant
when it stated that "a trial court shall award compensatory
damages up to three times the amount of actual damages."156
The court stated that when the Legislature defines the elements
of damage that comprise compensatory damages, the Legisla-
149. Id.
150. Id. Although Commonwealth supplied the court with cases that restrain a trial
court's discretion in multiplying damages under subdivision 2, the court held these
cases were erroneous. The court in Melsha v. Wickes Cos., 459 N.W.2d 707, 709
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990), rev. denied (Oct. 25, 1990), interpreted subdivision 2: "It is
within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether, in the interests ofjustice,
the actual damages must be multiplied in order for a victim to be fully compensated."
Phelps, 537 N.W.2d at 275 (citing Melsha, 459 N.W.2d at 709). In interpreting Meisha,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that: "Multiplied damages are permitted so as to
provide victims of discrimination with 'full and adequate compensation' in cases when
the amount of actual damages proved do not alone achieve that result." Id. (citing
Baufield v. Safelite Glass Corp., 831 F. Supp. 713, 720 (D. Minn. 1993)).
151. 459 N.W.2d 707 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
152. Phelps, 537 N.W.2d at 275.
153. Id. The court further stated that, to the extent that Me/sha and Baufield support
the contention that a trial court must tie the multiplication of damages to a finding of
uncompensated damages, those cases are erroneous. Id. The dissent supported
Commonwealth's contention on this point and would require a specific finding that
uncompensated damages exist. Id. at 278.
154. Id. at 275.
155. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990)).
156. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1994)). The dissent again argued
that this language requires a specific finding of uncompensated damages. Id. The
majority dismissed this argument by stating that "in the context of this statute, this
construction is unsupported by the language of the statute, and could lead to absurd
results in practice." Id.
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ture's directive will govern.157 The court concluded the Legis-
lature had defined compensatory damages under subdivision 2
to be an amount up to three times the actual damages prov-
en.
158
Third, Commonwealth contended the trial court's failure to
make any findings to support the multiple damages award was an
abuse of discretion.159  The court concluded that subdivision
2 does not require a trial court to make any findings to multiply
damages."6 Thus, the court held that because the Legislature
has not required specific findings under subdivision 2, no such
findings were necessary to support a trial court's decision to
multiply damages.
161
Fourth, Commonwealth argued the trial court's award of
both punitive damages and multiplied compensatory damages
constituted an unfair double recovery of punitive damages.
162
In support of their case, Commonwealth and Amici citedJohnson
v. Jensen6  and Fontaine v. Ebtec Corp.164 respectively." The
court distinguished these cases from the case at hand. The court
157. Id. In support of this contention, the court cited a comment to the Uniform
Commercial Code that provides that "compensatory damages are limited to compensa-
tion. They do not include... special damages.... " Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 336.1-106
(1994)). Presumably, no such comment specifies compensatory damages under
subdivision 2.
158. Id. at 275-76. The majority noted the impracticality of the dissent's argument
in length.
159. Id. at 276. Commonwealth based this argument on Sigurdson v. Isanti County
Because of the significance of factual issues in employment discrimination
cases and the attendant deference that must be accorded trial courts in
making their determinations on these issues, it is important that the basis for
the court's decision be set forth clearly and explicitly so that an appellate
court can conduct effective and meaningful review.
Id. (citing Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. 1986)). The court
stated that this argument was displaced because this quote referred to a trial court's
failure to make findings regarding the three-part McDonnell Dougkas Corp. discrimination
test. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). The





163. 446 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. 1989).
164. 613 N.E.2d 881 (Mass. 1993).
165. Phelps, 537 N.W.2d at 276. Commonwealth cited Johnson v. Jensen in support
of its argument. Id. (citingJohnson v.Jensen, 446 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. 1989)). Amici
cited Fontaine v. Ebtec Corp. in support of its case. Id. (citing Fontaine v. Ebtec Corp.,
613 N.E.2d 881 (Mass. 1993)).
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stated that both Johnson and Fontaine involved statutes that
required a finding similar to willfulness to multiply damages.
1 66
Therefore, the court concluded that because subdivision 2 does
not require an additional showing for imposing multiple
damages, these cases were distinguishable.1 67  The court fur-
ther concluded that the fact that it is unclear what damages are
being compensated under the multiplication provision of
subdivision 2 does not make the provision duplicative of punitive
damages.16 Because one of the objectives of subdivision 2 is
nonpunitive, namely to entice the private bar into bringing
MHRA claims, the court held multiple compensatory damages
are not duplicative of punitive damages. 69
Commonwealth's next argument was that subdivision 2 is
unconstitutional. 17' Although Commonwealth failed to raise
this argument at trial or at the court of appeals, the supreme
court stated it entertains a limited number of claims for the first
time at the supreme court.171  The court concluded, however,
this was not one of the limited times that they would entertain
such an appeal.
172
Finally, Commonwealth argued that the trial court errone-
ously included Phelps' back pay award as part of the amount that
was doubled.1 73 The court dismissed this argument, reasoning
that because the statute gives a trial court the option of includ-
ing back pay as part of the actual damages subject to multiplica-
tion, the trial court did not err by including back pay in the
multiplied amount of actual damages.
1 4
166. Id. Johnson involved Minnesota Statutes section 549.20, subdivision 1 (1988),
which stated that punitive damages are allowed upon a showing of willful indifference.
Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 277. In support of this proposition, the court cited DeJonghe v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 830 P.2d 862, 866 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
169. Phelps, 537 N.W.2d at 277. The court cited the legislative history of subdivision
2 in support of its position. Id. at 277 n.4. The dissent argued that any multiplication
of damages is necessarily punitive in nature. Id. at 279. The majority countered this
argument by stating that the Legislature seemed to intend the multiplying provisions
to have some other function distinct from punitive damages. Id. at 277.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 1992).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 278.
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E. Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act for Claims Under the Minnesota Human Rights
Act
In Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc.,1 75 the Minnesota Supreme
Court interpreted two statutes taken together: the Minnesota
Human Rights Act ("MHRA") and the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"). The plaintiff, Kristin Johnson, sued her former
employer, Piper Jaffray, Inc. ("Piper"), alleging age and gender
discrimination pursuant to the MHRA.
176
On March 9, 1992, at age twenty-one, Kristin Johnson was
hired by Piper as a corporate bond trader.177 To qualify for
her new position, Piper requiredJohnson to execute a "Uniform
Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer,"
commonly known as a "Form U-4."178 Johnson completed the
Form U-4, which specifically provided for arbitration of
claims. 179 Item twenty-three, paragraph five of the Form U-4
provided as follows:
I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may
arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any other
person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules,
constitutions, or by-laws of the organizations indicated in Item
10 as may be amended from time to time and that any
arbitration award rendered against me may be entered as a
judgement [sic] in any court of competent jurisdiction. 8 '
Item ten of the Form U-4 stated that she applied "to be regis-
tered with" two self-regulating organizations: the National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE")."'8 Johnson was terminated by Piper
on May 5, 1992.182 Piper stated in a termination notice that
Johnson was terminated for "unsatisfactory performance.
1 8 3
Johnson brought suit against Piper claiming Piper discrimi-
nated against her based on age and gender in violation of the
175. 530 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1995).
176. Id. at 792.
177. Id.





183. Id. NASD rules required Piper to file a U-5 termination notice with NASD. Id.
[Vol. 22
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MHRA, Minnesota Statutes section 363.03, subdivision 2.184
Johnson also brought a defamation claim against Piper based on
the termination notice."8 5 Piper moved for an order staying
the action and compelling arbitration which it alleged was
required under the Form U-4 that Johnson executed. 1 6  The
district court denied Piper's motions and concluded that the
parties had not agreed to arbitrate.1
87
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
holding that Johnson was required to arbitrate her claims
governed by the Form U-4 she signed.' On appeal to the
Minnesota Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued several reasons
why she should not be required to arbitrate her claims. The
supreme court was not persuaded by the plaintiff's argument and
affirmed the court of appeals decision. 9
First, Johnson contended that the Form U-4 she signed
constituted a "contract of employment" and thus was outside of
the FAA's scope of regulation.' Johnson argued that signing
the Form U-4 was a condition of her employment and thus was
a "contract of employment" and exempt from the purview of
section 1 of the FAA. 9' The court recognized however that
the FAA generally governs the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments contained in Form. U-4s.102  The U.S. Supreme Court
already addressed and rejected this same argument in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.:193




188. Johnson v. PiperJaffray, Inc., 515 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
189. Johnson, 530 N.W.2d at 792. The court reviewed the district court's determina-
tion that the parties did not agree to arbitrate the present dispute de novo. Id. at 795
(citing Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 494 (1992)).
Further, the court noted it was aware that it should resolve any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues in favor of arbitration. Johnson, 537 N.W.2d at 795 (citing
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
190. Id. at 793.
191. Id. Section 1 of the FAA provides in pertinent part: "[N]othing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
Presumably, Johnson was a worker engaged in interstate commerce.
192. Johnson, 530 N.W.2d at 794 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991)).
193. Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2).
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[T]he arbitration clause at issue is in [the plaintiff's] securi-
ties registration application, which is a contract with the
securities exchanges, not with [his employer] . ... [T]he
exclusionary clause in section 1 of the FAA is inapplicable to
arbitration clauses contained in such registration applications
.... [W]e therefore hold that section l's exclusionary clause
does not apply to [the plaintiff's] arbitration agreement.
19 4
As to this argument, the court held that because the Form U-4
arbitration clause was not part of Johnson's contract of employ-
ment with Piper, it did not fall within the exclusion from
arbitration provision contained in section 1 of the FAA. 95
Second, Johnson argued that even if the FAA did apply, she
did not have to arbitrate the claims because the relevant NASD
and NYSE rules do not require her to do so. 196 Disagreeing
with the court of appeals holding, the court stated that "arbitra-
tion is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to
submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit."'97 Thus, the court looked for a specific agreement
Johnson made agreeing to arbitrate her discrimination claims.
The only arbitration agreementJohnson signed was item twenty-
three, paragraph five of the Form U-4.19 The court concluded
that this provision in and of itself did not require arbitration of
all claims. Instead, it incorporated the rules, constitutions, and
by-laws of the NASD and NYSE." Therefore, the court next
examined provisions in the NASD Code.2°°
To determine whether the NASD Code required arbitration
of employment disputes between a member and a person
associated with a member, the court looked to two relevant
sections of the NASD Code: (1) parties who must arbitrate and
194. Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2). Johnson argued that the U.S. Supreme
Court did not decide whether the Form U-4 constitutes a contract of employment. Id.
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that Gilmer unequivocally stated that a
Form U-4 is not a contract of employment Id.
195. Id. at 795.
196. Id.
197. Id. (quoting AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S.
643, 648 (1986)). The court of appeals held that the Form U-4 alone requiredJohnson
to arbitrate her discrimination claims regardless of what the specific rules of NASD and
NYSE provide. Id.
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(2) matters eligible for submission."21 Parties whose disputes
are to be arbitrated are set out in the NASD Code, part II, para-
graph 3708, section 8(a), which states in pertinent part:
Any dispute, claim or controversy eligible for submission
under Part I of this Code between or among members
and/or associated persons, and/or certain others, arising in
connection with the business of such member(s) or in
connection with the activities of such associated person(s),
shall be arbitrated under this Code.. 22
The NASD Code, matters eligible for submission, are provided
in part I, paragraph 3701, section 1:
This Code of Arbitration Procedure is prescribed.., for the
arbitration of any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of
.. any member of the Association... (1) between or among
members; (2) between or among members and public
customers, or others, and (3) between or among members,
registered clearing agencies.., and participants, pledgees or
other persons using the facilities of a registered clearing
agency .... 203
Relying on Strappes Group, Inc. v. A.H. Siedle,2°4 the court
concluded that section 1(2)'s "or others" necessarily implicated
"persons associated with members" to arbitrate employment
claims otherwise portions of section eight would be rendered
meaningless. °5
Johnson next contended that she was not a "person
associated with a member" within the meaning of the Code.0 6
The applicable NASD provision is article 1, section 1 (m) of the
NASD bylaws, which defines a "person associated with a mem-
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing NASD Code, Part II, Para. 3708, Section 8 (a)).
203. Id. (citing NASD Code, part I, 3701, section 1 (2) (emphasis added)). An
amendment to the NASD Code specifically provided for arbitration of claims arising out
of the employment or termination of employment of associated persons with any
member. However, Johnson's claims are governed by the above cited Code. Johnson,
530 N.W.2d at 796-97 n.1. The court noted that the NASD explained the reason for
adding this language was to clarify its long-held understanding that employment
disputes were to be arbitrated under section 8. Id. at 797 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 39,071
(1993)).
204. No. CV 93-11385-K, 1993 WL 443926 (D.Mass. Nov. 22, 1993).
205. Johnson, 530 N.W.2d at 797 (citing Strappes Group, Inc. v. A.H. Siedle, 1993 WL
443926, at *4). The court rejected a Seventh Circuit opinion that held that "or others"
did not include a 'person associated with a member.' Johnson, 530 N.W.2d at 797
(citing Farrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 993 F.2d 1253, 1255 (7th Cir. 1993)).
206. Id. at 798.
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ber":
[E]very sole proprietor, partner, officer, director, or branch
manager of any member, or any natural person occupying a
similar status or performing similar functions, or any natural
person engaged in the investment banking or securities
business who is directly or indirectly controlling or controlled
by such member, whether or not any such person is regis-
tered. 207
The court rejected Johnson's argument that her job duties
needed to be examined to determine if she was a "person
associated with a member."20 8 The court held that regardless
of what duties she actually performed, Johnson's job title at
Piper was a bond trader, which squarely fits with the NASD's
definition of a "person associated with a member."2 9  Thus,
the NASD Code required Johnson to arbitrate her claims against
Piper. 10
Third, even though the relevant NASD rules required
Johnson to arbitrate her claims, Johnson contended that the
MHRA discrimination claims she brought were not subject to
compulsory arbitration under the FAA because they were a part
of the class of claims not subject to arbitration.21 1 The court
had to decide whether Johnson's claims were "within a class of
claims as to which agreements to arbitrate are held unenforce-
able."21 2 Relying on Gilmer, the court determined that Johnson
had to demonstrate that "'Congress itself [had] evinced an
intention to preclude a waiver' of a judicial forum for the
[MHRA] claims at issue," otherwise Johnson would be held to
her agreement to arbitrate. 13
Concluding that the FAA governed state anti-discrimination
claims, the court determined that it was obliged to draw an
analogy to the equivalent federal claim and determine what
Congress' intent was with regard to the rights created by the
207. Id. (citing NASD By-laws, Article I, Section 1 (m)).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. The court declined to analyze whether the NYSE required Johnson to
arbitrate her claims because the NASD Code already required her to do so. Id. at 798
n.3.
211. Id. at 799.
212. Id. at 798-99 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
213. Id. at 799 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26).
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federal law.214 Therefore, the court looked to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") for Johnson's gender
discrimination claim, and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA") for Johnson's age discrimination claim to deter-
mine whether it was Congress' intent to exclude these claims
from the purview of the FAA.215
As decided by Gilmer, the court concluded that ADEA Claims
are conclusively arbitrable under the FAA if they were the subject
of an arbitration agreement. 16 Thus, Johnson's age discrimi-
nation claim is arbitrable even though it was brought under the
MHRA.217 As to Johnson's gender discrimination claim, the
court relied on a Fifth Circuit decision that held that Title VII
claims are subject to compulsory arbitration because Title VII's
statutory scheme is substantially similar to the ADEA's.218 The
court rejected an Eighth Circuit decision that held specifically
that "Congress has articulated an intent through the text and
legislative history of Title VII to preclude waiver of judicial
remedies for violation of both federal Title VII rights and
parallel state statutory rights, thereby exempting state statutes
from the provisions of the [FAA]."219 The court, however,
concluded that the Eighth Circuit decision relied heavily on
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 220 and Gardner-Denver's reason-
ing was effectively limited by Gilmer.221  The court held that
Johnson's gender discimination claim was subject to arbitration
under the FAA because to hold otherwise could create a
214. Id. (citing Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 619 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1993)).
215. Id. The court, relying on Gilmer, stated that if such intent existed, it should be
evidenced in the text of the statute, its legislative history, or an "inherent conflict"
between the statute's underlying purpose and arbitration. Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S.
at 26).
216. Id. at 799-800.
217. Id. at 800.
218. Id. (citing Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir.
1991)). The Alford court relied on the Gilmer decision in finding Title VII claims
arbitrable under the FAA. See Johnson, 530 N.W.2d at 800. Since Gilmer, four other
circuits have concluded that Title VII claims are subject to the FAA. Id. at 800 n.5.
219. Id. at 800-01 (quoting Swenson v. Management Recruiters Intern, Inc., 858 F.2d
1304, 1309 (8th Cir. 1988)). The court also rejected language in the legislative history
to the 1991 amendments to Title VII that suggested concern about employees being
required to arbitrate Title VII claims. See id. 530 N.W.2d at 801 n. 8.
220. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
221. Johnson, 530 N.W.2d at 801 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
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hazardous dichotomy between ADEA claims and Title VII
claims.222
Fourth,Johnson argued that her agreement to arbitrate with
Piper was not enforceable. Specifically, Johnson argued that
because there was unequal bargaining power, she was forced to
sign the agreement, thus the arbitration agreement should be
invalidated. 223  Again relying on Gilmer, the court concluded
that the Supreme Court had already rejected this same argu-
ment.224 In Gilmer, the plaintiff executed an arbitration agree-
ment identical to Johnson's agreement and the Court enforced
that agreement.2 25  Because Johnson did not allege any facts
that would have supported a claim of coercion or fraud, the
court rejected Johnson's argument that the contract was
unenforceable based on these grounds.
226
Fifth, Johnson alleged that procedural deficiencies in the
arbitration process should render compulsory arbitration invalid.
Again, the plaintiff in Gilmer made this same argument and the
Court rejected it because a party "trades the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity,
informality, and expedition of arbitration."227 The court thus
held that it was bound by Gilmer to reject Johnson's procedural
deficiency argument.
22
Finally, Johnson argued that her arbitration agreement
requiring her to arbitrate her claims brought under the MHRA
is unenforceable because the MHRA voids all agreements
purporting to waive the right to ajudicial forum. Similar to her
contention that age and gender claims brought under the
MHRA are not subject to arbitration, Johnson contended that
her agreement to arbitrate her claims was unenforceable because
the MHRA voids any agreement purporting to prospectively
222. Id. at 801.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 802.
225. Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33). The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that
"[miere inequality in bargaining power ... is not a sufficient reason to hold that
arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context." Johnson, 530
N.W.2d at 802 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33). The Gilmer Court further noted that
there was no indication that the plaintiff in Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was
coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause contained in the Form U-4.
Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 802-03 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31).
228. Id. at 803.
[Vol. 22
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 23
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol22/iss1/23
LABOR AD EMPLOYMENT
waive the right to a judicial forum. 29 Johnson further "con-
tend[ed] that the FAA'does not pre-empt the MHRA's voiding
provision.""a The court relied on section 2 of the FAA, which
provided: "A written provision in any... contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
21 1
For interpretaion of this provision, the court looked to Southland
Corp. v. Keating.232 The U.S. Supreme Court in Southland stated
that "In enacting section 2 of the [FAA], Congress declared a
national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims
which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitra-
"2331tion. "  Relying on Sacks v. Richardson Greenshield Sec., Inc.,23 4
the Court held that " [ t]he FAA pre-empts any conflicting state
law to the extent the state law requires a judicial forum."35
The court next analyzed the MHRA. The MHRA embodies
a judicial enforcement process and voids agreements that
purport to waive the right to a judicial forum. 236 Determining
that the voiding provision of the MHRA would void Johnson's
arbitration agreement, the court concluded that the FAA and the
MHRA conflict.2 7 Thus, the court concluded that the FAA
pre-empts the MHRA and held that Johnson's arbitration
agreement was enforceable under the FAA, notwithstanding the
MHRA's embrace of a judicial forum.
238
F Age Discrimination Under the Minnesota Human Rights Act
The case of Dietrich v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.3 9 involved an
employee who was eliminated under a bona fide reduction-in-
229. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 363.031 & 363.14 (1994)).
230. Id.
231. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)).
232. Id. (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)).
233. Id. (citing Southland, 465 U.S. at 10).
234. 718 F. Supp. 1475 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
235. Johnson, 530 N.W.2d at 803 (citing Sacks, 781 F.Supp. 1475, 1480 (E.D. Cal.
1991)).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 803-04.
238. Id. at 804.
239. 536 N.W.2d 319 (Minn. 1995).
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force and subsequently brought an age discrimination claim
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA").24°
Cheri Dietrich was employed as a clerk-stenographer by Soo
Line Railroad from 1988 to September 1991.241 In March
1991, when Dietrich was forty-six years old, Soo Line began
discussing an "office automation project" to streamline clerical
staff operations by forming a new office comprised of employees
from both the engineering and transportation departments.
2 42
This project specifically included acquiring computer equipment,
establishing an on-line filing system, training personnel and
consolidating redundant administrative activities.243
Dietrich alleged that in March 1991, both Vern Graham,
Dietrich's manager, and Robert Tisdall, the vice president of
Dietrich's department, told her and other employees that no
jobs would be eliminated as result of the office automation pro-
ject.241 Prior to implementation of the project, a thirty-six-year-
old Soo Line stenographer, Anita Migliaccio, was selected to be
a "records trainer."2 1  Six months later, on August 1, 1991,
Migliaccio was selected for the Records Analyst position which
was newly created by Soo Line.246  Dietrich believed she was
the most logical candidate to take the position of Records
Analyst, and because Soo Line groomed Migliaccio for the
position, Soo Line unlawfully discriminated against her.2' 7 On
August 29, 1991, Tisdall announced that Dietrich's position as
240. Id. at 321.
241. Id. Dietrich began employment with Soo Line in October 1986, although she
was not employed as a clerk-stenographer until March 1988. Id. Dietrich's duties as a
clerk-stenographer included maintaining the central filing system for the transportation
and operations departments, filing records, preparing invoices, sorting and delivering
mail, and printing and distributing morning reports. Id. at 322.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 321-22.
245. Id. at 322. Soo Line stated that Migliaccio was chosen for the position because
of her computer experience and excellent recommendations. Id.
246. Id. This position entailed running the new electronic filing system, but also
included continuing manual filing and all of Dietrich's filing work. Id.
247. Id. Dietrich claimed that throughout the office automation, she was denied
training and experience on the new computer system. Dietrich expressed her
opposition to the handling of the reorganization and stated she felt discriminated
against on August 6, 1991. Dietrich also contacted her union representative four or five
times between March and July 1991. Id.
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clerk stenographer was to be abolished on September 5,
1991.2" Upon learning this information, Dietrich voluntarily
furloughed herself.
2 9
Dietrich subsequently applied for other positions within Soo
Line. She was denied two separate positions because she "lacked
the level of knowledge required for the use of personal comput-
ers and the company's electronic communications system" and
because she lacked necessary "technical knowledge." 25" Diet-
rich then wrote several letters to management alleging the unfair
treatment she perceived by Soo Line.251
Soo Line maintained that Dietrich's position was eliminated
as part of a company-wide reduction-in-force. Soo Line further
alleged they had been downsizing for a decade and that they
abolished thirty-two clerical positions between June and Septem-
ber 1991.252 Dietrich disputed Soo Line's position and ques-
tioned whether a true reduction-in-force occurred.53
On November 12, 1991, Dietrich filed a complaint with the
Department of Human Rights. 254 Dietrich then brought suit
for age discrimination and reprisal under the MHRA against Soo
Line, Graham and Tisdall.255
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Soo
Line and dismissed both the age discrimination and reprisal
claims.256 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, stating
that general issues of material fact remained in dispute.257 The
Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals,
holding that Dietrich failed to allege facts to make a prima facie
case of employment discrimination and thus, reinstated the trial
248. Id. A 68-year-old's position as requisition and material clerk was also abolished
on September 5, 1991. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 322-23.
251. Id. at 323.
252. Id. Regarding this particular office automation project, Soo Line asserted that
four of seven positions were abolished and two positions were created. Id.
253. Id. In support of her position, Dietrich alleged that some of her job duties
were redistributed to younger employees. She further alleged that Soo Line had to hire
more management and temporary workers to assist with the workload when the clerical
positions were abolished. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 321.
256. Id.
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court's decision.258
The court first applied the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green259 test to Dietrich's MHRA age discrimination claim
concerning her job elimination.2" The U.S. Supreme Court
summarized the McDonnell Douglas test in Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine.
261
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the prepon-
derance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.
Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection. Third, should the defendant carry this burden the
plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons
offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were
a pretext for discrimination.262
To establish the first step, the court required Dietrich to prove
either direct or indirect evidence of discrimination.
2 63  Sigurd-
son v. Isanti County2 64 set out the proof scheme required to
show indirect discrimination:
(1) that plaintiff is a member of a protected group;
(2) that plaintiff sought and was qualified for opportunities
that the employer made available to others;
(3) that plaintiff, despite her qualifications, was denied those
opportunities; and
(4) the opportunities remained available or were given to
other persons with plaintiffs qualifications.
2 65
Because the fourth element of this proof scheme is virtually
impossible to show when there has been a reduction-in-force, the
court applied a modified version of this test.266  Under the
258. Id.
259. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
260. Dietrich, 530 N.W.2d at 323. The court has adopted the three-part test
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
261. Dietrich, 536 N.W.2d at 323. The McDonnell Douglas framework was summarized
in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
262. Dietrich, 536 N.W.2d at 323 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53).
263. Id.
264. 386 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. 1986).
265. Id. (citing Sigurdson, 386 N.W.2d at 720). This test is considered the "McDonnell
Douglas prima facie test." See id. 324.
266. Id. (citing Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161, 1165-66 (8th Cir. 1985)). The
court believed this modified test fairly accommodated situations involving reductions-in-
force. Id. at 324.
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modified test, the Holley test, when a plaintiffs discharge takes
place as part of a reduction-in-force, "some additional showing
[of age discrimination] should be necessary to make a prima
facie case." 267 The court recognized that the Holley test would
not apply to Dietrich unless there was in fact a bona fide
reduction-in-force, thus the court next analyzed if a reduction-in-
force actually occurred.2
To determine whether a reduction-in-force had occurred,
the court applied a standard articulated by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals:
[A] work force reduction situation occurs when business
considerations cause an employer to eliminate one or more
positions within the company. An employee is not eliminated
as part of a work force reduction when he or she is replaced
after his or her discharge. However, a person is not replaced
when another employee is assigned to perform the plaintiff's
duties in addition to other duties, or when the work is
redistributed among other existing employees already
performing related work. A person is replaced only when
another person is hired or reassigned to perform the plain-
tiff's duties. 69
The court scrutinized the trial court's record of the facts.
Agreeing with the trial court's findings, that "[s] ome duties were
abolished in order to eliminate, consolidate and streamline
unnecessary and redundant tasks" and "[a] fter the abolishment
of [Dietrich's] position, the position duties were distributed to
five different people ... ." the supreme court concluded those
facts clearly indicated that the Sixth Circuit test had been
met.2 70 The court thus held that Soo Line did in fact engage
in a reduction-in-force program. 1
Because Soo Line engaged in a reduction-in-force, the court
concluded it was necessary for Dietrich to make an additional
267. Id. (citing Holly, 771 F.2d at 1165). The purpose of this added requirement
is because the employer's reason for discharging the employee is not otherwise
unexplained. Id.
268. Id. (citing Rinehart v. City of Independence, 35 F.3d 1263, 1266-67 (8th Cir.
1994) cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1822 (1995)).
269. Id. (citing Barnes v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990)).
270. Id. at 325. The court conceded, however, that an explicit factual finding on
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showing of age discrimination under Holley.272 As evidence of
this additional showing, Dietrich argued that she was the oldest
person in her department and that herjob duties were distribut-
ed to younger, less-qualified employees.273 However, the court
stated that Dietrich failed to show any evidence that the
employees were less qualified than her.274 Further, the employ-
ees were within a few years in age of her.275 The court recog-
nized that "the fact that a younger worker is retained after a
reduction.. . in force is insufficient in itself to establish a prima
facie case of age discrimination. " 76 The trial court record
concluded that Dietrich offered no evidence that her position
was eliminated because of age rather than as a result of the
office automation project.277 Because Dietrich failed to estab-
lish a prima facie case of age discrimination, the supreme court
held that summaryjudgment was appropriate and thus reinstated
the trial court's decision.278
The court next addressed Dietrich's age discrimination
claims with respect to training and hiring opportunities.279
Dietrich argued that she was denied the opportunity to obtain
the training or experience necessary to operate the company's
new computer system because the personal computer she had at
her desk was not connected to the network.28 0  Dietrich re-
quested training from Soo Line and availed herself of a half-day
training class.28  The court found no discriminatory motive by
272. Id. Neither Dietrich nor Soo Line disputed that Dietrich satisfied the first or
second elements of the prima facie case. As to the third requirement, the trial court
found that because Dietrich was on furlough status, she was not discharged. However,
the court of appeals reversed, holding that Dietrich's furlough status at least raised a
question of material fact as to whether she suffered an "adverse employment action."
Id. (citing Johnson, 522 N.W.2d at 389). The supreme court agreed. The court found
it particularly significant that Dietrich received unemployment benefits thus suggesting





276. Id.; see also Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465; Kypke v. Burlington N. R.R., 928 F.2d 285,
286 (8th Cir. 1991) (requiring no more than the fact that a younger employee assumed
the plaintiffs duties).
277. Dietrich, 536 N.W.2d at 325-26.
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Soo Line because Dietrich failed to show that she had any reason
to use the new computer system in the job duties of her old
position. 82
Finally, the court addressed Dietrich's reprisal claims.
283
Dietrich alleged that her job elimination and Soo Line's
subsequent refusal to hire her were retaliatory in nature under
Minnesota Statutes section 363.03, subdivision 7.284 Because
the trial court found that Dietrich had not made a specific
accusation of age discrimination prior to filing the MHRA claim,
the court concluded that the filing of the claim would be the
first protected act in which a reprisal claim would apply.
285
The court of appeals disagreed, holding that Dietrich's letters to
management and verbal protests constituted protected activi-
ty.286
The court looked to the statute for guidance: "An employer
may not intentionally engage in reprisal against an employee
because the employee '[o]pposed a practice forbidden under
this chapter or has filed a charge, testified, assisted, or participat-
ed in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this chapter.'
28 7
Applying the McDonnell Douglas test to reprisal claims, the
court required Dietrich to prove (1) that she engaged in
statutorily-protected conduct; (2) that there was an adverse
employment action by Soo Line; and (3) that a causal connec-
tion existed between the two.2' The court stated that the
third element of this proof scheme could be satisfied "by
evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory
motive ... 289
The court concluded that Dietrich did not make public
allegations of discrimination until she filed the MHRA claim
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 7 (1994).
285. Dietrich, 536 N.W.2d at 326.
286. Id. (citingJohnson, 522 N.W.2d at 392).
287. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 7(1) (1990)). Reprisal includes "[A]ny
form of intimidation, retaliation, or harassment. It is a reprisal for an employer to...
refuse to hire ... [t]o depart from any customary employment practice; transfer or
assign the individual to a lesser position in terms of wages, hours,job classification, job
security, or other employment status." Id. at 326-27 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.03,
subd. 7 (1990)).
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which was the protected activity at hand.2 0  Thus, the court
held that the trial court was correct in granting summary
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